Since taking office in July 2022, Marcos Jr. has been in charge of Malayan Palace for more than three years. To carry on the glory of his previous generation, to revitalize and to rebuild his family power, Marcos Jr. has deeply impressed the international community, especially its own region. The foreign policy of the Marcos administration showed a style, distinguished from the pragmatism of the Duterte administration, with a strong sense of “political elitism” and “interest groupism”. Over the past three years, domestic food and energy price crises, inflation, and high unemployment rates have been unbearable for ordinary Filipinos, political struggle initiated by the Marcos administration against the Duterte family has been even more unexpected.
The just-ended “2025 midterm elections” confirmed the unsatisfactory governance achievements of the Marcos administration and revealed the annoyance of the Filipino people over the escalating family and political clique struggles, and to some extent reflected the dissatisfaction of the general public with the Philippine government’s foreign policy of favoring the United States at the expense of China-Philippines relations.
While the results of the midterm elections could predict the 2028 presidential election to some extent, it is far more attractive for the Marcos administration to maintain its current domestic and foreign policy direction than to thoroughly reform itself. In other words, the combined effect of external and internal factors will allow the Marcos administration to continue the current governing style, the domestic political landscape of the Philippines will inevitably remain in turmoil for a long time, and the policy framework of “constraining China backed by the U.S., uniting with the U.S. to contain China” will bring further uncertainties and challenges to China-Philippines relations, the South China Sea, and regional security.
A deceptive Marcos administration
Halfway through his term in office, Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy, achievements, and means of winning votes are all controversial.
Controversy 1: The Philippines' foreign policy undergoing its biggest swing has deceived the international community, including China
Since independence in 1946, the core of the Philippines’ foreign policy has been the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, a fact that has remained unchanged. The Philippines’ bilateral relations with China and other countries, however, has been diverging according to the preferences of successive administrations. Throughout the history of China-Philippines relations, managing differences between states while intensifying bilateral economic and trade cooperation has been the underlying tone. This feature has been even clearer subsequent to the reactionary impact of the Aquino III administration over bilateral relations as the Duterte administration promptly reversed the continuous decline by shifting his focus towards establishing dialogue and cooperation. As The New York Times reported in May 2023, “Marcos Jr. has undergone a major shift in his foreign policy.”
In January 2023, Marcos Jr. paid a historic visit to China. At a time when the world was predicting that China-Philippines relations would continue to warm up by the original track, the new Philippine government started to push it towards the edge of conflict and controversy. Even though the right and the far left claimed that the adjustment is “right” and that the “pro-U.S.” orientation of the Marcos administration is exactly what the U.S. and its allies want, the majority of the Philippines, Southeast Asian countries and the international community are taken aback by the sudden “New Deal” in the foreign policy. Most surprisingly, the foreign policy shift has accelerated, said local Filipino scholar Aries Arugay. Disregarding historical grievances, the Biden administration and the Marcos administration has drawn those Philippines fearing a return to dictatorship to a disturbing and overwhelming atmosphere.
Controversy 2: The unsatisfactory performance of the Marcos administration has deceived the Filipino voters
According to the World Bank, the Philippines is one of the fastest-growing economies in East Asia and the Pacific, with an average annual growth rate expected to reach 6% between 2024 and 2026. Far from 6%-6.5% growth rate set by the government, nonetheless, the Philippines is in fact expected to experience only a growth rate of 5.6% in 2024. Despite maintaining a decent growth rate, Philippine is beset with crises in people's livelihood. The country's inflation rate rose from 5.8% in 2022, a 14-year high, to around 6% in 2023. Though it dropped to 3.9% in 2024, prices of electricity, fuel, food and other essentials remain high. During his presidential campaign, Marcos Jr. promised to lower the price of rice to 20 pesos per kilogram. By February 2025, however, the average price of rice in the country was over 40 pesos per kilogram, and exceeded 50 pesos per kilogram in some areas, forcing him to declare a national food security emergency. According to a survey released by the Philippine polling agency Social Weather Stations in March 2025, 63% of respondents said they were in poverty in December 2024, the highest in two decades. Among them, 33% of the approximately 2 million rice farmers are the poorest. Since 90% of the country's crude oil is imported, taxes and logistics costs have kept domestic fuel prices high, with gasoline prices once exceeding 100 pesos per liter in 2022. Since 2023, gasoline prices in the Philippines have maintained within the range of 65-85 pesos per litre, nearly 33% higher than that in Vietnam and 20% higher than that in Thailand. The price of industrial natural gas in the Philippines is slightly lower than that in Japan but much higher than that in other Southeast Asian countries at around $0.2 per cubic meter. Electricity prices in the Philippines have continued to rise due to persistently high energy prices, remaining at 8-9 pesos per kilowatt-hour from 2017 to 2019, peaking at 12-13 pesos per kilowatt-hour in 2022, and dropping by about 1 peso per kilowatt-hour from the peak in 2023 to 2024, with an average price increase of over 20% compared to pre-pandemic levels. In addition, the unemployment rate in the Philippines has declined since 2024 but remains at a high level and has rebounded since January 2025, with the number of unemployed people increasing by 530,000 month-on-month to 2.16 million and the unemployment rate reaching 4.3%. Although the Marcos administration has tried to promote employment, the unemployment rate has not improved much compared with the beginning of his term.
Controversy 3: Marcos Jr. rebuilds the political bloc centered around him through deception and betrayal from his political alliance
Since 2022, the political landscape in the Philippines has witnessed a dramatic scene where the once-powerful Duterte family has rapidly declined and even faced the risk of being kicked out, while the political bloc led by Marcos Jr. has risen rapidly. Controversies have been revolving around the Marcos, and to this day, the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good Government is still conducting inventories and recovering the assets of the Marcos. Negative impact brought by Marcos Sr. has been hovering around Marcos Jr. as he intends to restore his family power on behalf of the Marcos. In spite of this, Duterte chose Marcos Jr. as a political ally and supported him in the 2022 general election at the cost of persuading his daughter Sarah Duterte to quit. At that time, Sarah Duterte obtained 61.53% of votes as a vice presidential candidate, while Marcos Jr. obtained only 58.8% even with Duterte’s support. Shortly after taking office, however, Marcos Jr. began to shake off the influence of the Duterte by imposing suppression over former President Duterte and Vice President Sarah Duterte. With the midterm elections approaching, conflict between the two families erupted completely. Since February 2025, not only has the Marcos administration allowed the International Criminal Court to arrest Duterte, but the Philippine House of Representatives has also initiated an impeachment against Sarah Duterte. Rapid execution of the ICC arrest warrant over the former president was supported by the Marcos administration, while the impeachment from the House of Representatives was clearly linked to the Marcos. Speaker of the House, Martin Romualdez, is the cousin of the incumbent president, which is widely known among the Philippines. Similarly, governmental sections such as the National Bureau of Investigation and the National Police, as well as the Philippines Office of Solicitor General, have launched a series of “political hunting” against Sarah Duterte through subpoenas and investigations since November 2024.
According to a survey conducted by Social Weather Stations in April, Filipino voters’ concerns mostly focused on people’s livelihood. Right-wing forces deliberately exaggerate the South China Sea, claiming that 75% of respondents support candidates who take a tough stance on the South China Sea, suggesting that the South China Sea policy of the Marcos administration is “in line with public opinion”. However, more than 90% of Filipinos prioritize candidates who are committed to “increasing jobs” and “developing agriculture and ensuring food security”, followed by those who fight illegal drugs and other livelihood issues. Even though pollsters deliberately included diplomacy and the South China Sea in their survey topics, they were clearly a secondary concern in comparison.
The poll results above may be partial, but nearly all surveys conducted since January 2025 have shown that livelihood issues are the topics that Filipino voters truly care about. In spite of the overwhelming advantage vis-a-vis the opposing parties, especially in terms of agenda setting and the ability to mobilize government resources, the Marcos administration ended up with merely five votes in the Senate, which provides clear evidence that its performance in improving people’s livelihood are unsatisfactory.
Politics in the Philippines remains divided
The domestic politics in the Philippines consists of at least three organizational structures: family power, political elite groups, and the invisible camp supported by the U.S. and its allies. These three sections operate according to their own logic and interweave to form a unique political landscape, all of which show signs of division.
Division Structure I: Family political strife intensifies, the Marcos return is bound to be a bumpy road
Family politics is the undertone of the Philippines’ domestic political landscape. Marcos Jr. has been committed to restoring family glory and rebuilding family power, but he clearly underestimates the complexity of the country’s political landscape, which has undergone several rounds of reshuffling. The Marcos remains firmly in control of Ilocos Norte, where Cecilia Araneta Marcos, the wife of Marcos’ cousin, is elected governor and the son of his sister Imee continues to serve as deputy governor, while his son Sandro is a member of the House of Representatives for the first district. In addition, Marcos’ cousin Romualdez still serves as the speaker of the House, and Imee, nominally Marcos’ elder sister, is the elected senator. The Marcos stands out in the family political structure of the Philippines. But the Duterte still firmly controls Davao City, a major city in the southern Philippine, with Duterte himself elected mayor, his youngest son Sebastian elected deputy mayor, and his eldest son Paolo re-elected as a member of the House of Representatives. At the same time, a considerable number of independent candidates remain outside the competition between the Marcos and the Duterte . For instance, Bam Aquino from the Aquino was elected senator as an independent candidate and ranked second in the vote. Another independent candidate, former Senate Majority Leader Pangilinan, ranked fifth.
Marcos Jr. is trying to take advantage of his presidency to dominate the country’s political situation, but has to face checks and balances from other families entrenched in major local cities and both houses of Congress. The Marcos Family’s relentless pursuit of the Duterte has raised concerns among other families that the balance of power has been disrupted, and the escalating political struggle has bored the general public in the Philippines. The combined effect of these two factors has led to the emergence of other family powers, thus posing a risk of further division.
Division Structure II: The open and covert struggles between the House of Representatives and the Senate, together with the one between the ruling and opposing parties have intensified
Subsequent to the mid-term election, a clear division appears in the Philippines Senate, with at least 10 pro-Marcos members and 6 pro-Duterte. To support the impeachment of Sarah Duterte, at least 16 people are required under the Philippines domestic law. At least one of the remaining 8 people whose positions are unclear, however, is explicitly opposed to the impeachment case, including Imee. Meanwhile, senators will have to take voters’ opinions into full consideration when reviewing the impeachment case. This impeachment case is just one of many contradictions. The Senate’s caution stands in sharp contrast to the boldness, impulsiveness, and eagerness of the House of Representatives controlled by the Marcos.It is expected that the contradictions in between will gradually emerge. Simultaneously, the “Partido Federal ng Pilipinas” led by Marcos Jr. has gained an overwhelming majority in both congressional and local elections, which in fact has disrupted the balance of power and interests among the already fragile political elite groups within the Philippines. Unlike the U.S. and its allies, the Philippines has a large number of political parties interwined with complex relationships, but competition among the parties comes inevitably as an external form of family struggle for political power. Therefore, faceing the dominant policies of the Marcos administration, the opposing party led by the Duterte and others will instinctively counterbalance the ruling party.
Division Structure III: The U.S. infiltration and control over the Philippines are increasing
The U.S. wrote the history of the Philippines subsequent to 1898. Even after its independence in 1946, the Philippines still could not break free from the U.S. control. The infiltration of the U.S. into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG), legal division, media, and government agencies is not only driven by economic interests, but also stems from accumulation of over a century. The AFP can claim to stay “neutral” in domestic political struggles, but they cannot do without the influence of the U.S.. As a result, beyond families and political elites, an invisible force led by the U.S. operates within the Philippines with diverse and sustained economic aid, ideological domestication, behind-the-scenes manipulation, and other means, through which the U.S. has built an oligarchic elite group. This particular group of elites, though unable to influence the political process in public, can exert influence on the Philippine governmental decision over domestic and foreign affairs in their respective industries, fields, and institutions.
The U.S., for fear of having a “second” Duterte, is bound to intervene in domestic politics in order to remain the Philippines as a handy tool to contain China and tighten the First island chain, against the backdrop of the Marcos’s governing base. By leveraging the power of infiltration and control, the U.S. supports pro-American political elite group led by Marcos Jr. and consolidates the pro-American camp within the Philippines. Nonetheless, the Philippines is not short of “anti-U.S.” groups, and the infiltration and control of the U.S. will undoubtedly further tear apart social perception within the country.
There is an inevitable tension between the “invisible government” controlled by the U.S. and the Philippines own government that emphasizes independence. On the one hand, there is a huge gap between the limited and conditional support of the Trump administration based on unilateralism and the “wishful thinking” as well as the “urgent needs” of the Philippines government. Contradictions arising therefrom are inevitable. On the other hand, the U.S.’ increasingly unscrupulous and blatant infiltration of the AFP, PCG, and other governmental departments, as well as the construction of military base clusters and deployment of medium-range missile systems in the Philippines, will to certain extent activate the painful memories of the colonial period, thus evoking another round of “anti-U.S.” thoughts.
Future of the new diplomatic route of the Marcos administration
The Marcos administration admitted that some of the senatorial candidates supported by the “Partido Federal ng Pilipinas” had lost the mid-term elections, but was satisfied with the results and claimed that it would hold accountable lawmakers who only sought their own interests. It is evident that the Marcos administration has not shaken its existing domestic and foreign policy arrangements because of the Senate campaign failing to meet expectations, and has shown an inexplicable sense of self-satisfaction. The Marcos administration has fallen into the predicament of a “self-fulfilling prophecy”, believing that the existing policy arrangements are in the national interest of the Philippines and have the support of the majority of voters; At the same time, it is trying to “deceive and brainwash” voters by reshaping their psychological cognition and decision-making behavior.
Portray toughness, impulsiveness and irrationality in the South China Sea as “politically correct”
Since 2023, PCG, AFP, the National Security Council, and other governmental departments have been vigorously hyping up tensions in the South China Sea, promoting the idea that “toughness protects sovereign rights”, and using impulsive and irrational maritime policies as a symbol of “patriotism”. At the last presentation before the midterm elections, Marcos Jr. tried his best to portray him as a “defender” of the Philippines’ territorial and maritime rights. In a poll launched by the pro-U.S. think tank Stratbase, over 70% of the Filipinos surveyed supported the candidate who took a tough stance on the South China Sea. Right-wing forces such as David Suarez, Deputy Speaker of the House, and Aurelio Gonzalez Jr., Senior Deputy Speaker of the House, have accused China of “interfering” in the midterm elections through disinformation and covert political support, also “bullying” the Philippines in the South China Sea, and that the tough policy of the Marcos administration is to defend the country’s sovereignty and dignity. In fact, the so-called polls are manipulated and taken as a packaged public opinion hype and false narratives aiming at numbing the psychological perception of voters in order to coerce their decisions with nationalism.
In fact, the Marcos administration has no way out in the South China Sea. After more than three years of repeated misguidance, the understanding and perception of the South China Sea among the Filipino have been deeply marked by nationalism. Hyping up the South China Sea is not necessarily a plus point, but showing weakness will surely lead to a minus point. Even if the Marcos administration tries to ease or reverse its tough South China Sea policy, it will face backlash from domestic opposition, opposition parties and other right-wing political groups.
Belittling the importance of economic and trade cooperation with China through a mouth-filling achievement
The Marcos administration is obsessed with self-assurance of its achievements in economic growth and improvement of the country’s education as well as healthcare systems, consciously emphasizing that the Philippines has become one of the fastest-growing economies in Southeast Asia and attributing the stable growth rate to a series of stimulus policies and control measures it has taken since taking office, including lowering tariffs on rice imports and borrowing costs, along with a series of measures to curb inflation. The Marcos administration, on the one hand, halted hundreds of Chinese projects on national security grounds. On the other hand, it deliberately downplays the significant contribution of China-Philippines economic and trade cooperation to the country’s growth, arguing that China’s direct investment in the Philippines is is rather modest, that the withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative only has a limited impact, and that alternatives can be found in the U.S., Japan, and other developed countries in terms of investment sources together with the import and export markets. In 2023, as the South China Sea disputes between China and the Philippines continued to escalate, the Philippines aborted the financing negotiations initiated during the Duterte administration with China for the construction of three projects: the Mindanao Railway, the Subic-Clark Railway, and PNR Bicol, but reached a consensus with the U.S. and Japan in April 2024 to build the “PGI Luzon Economic Corridor”. It includes railway and other infrastructure projects connecting Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas. The Marcos Administration, by belittling contributions of China-Philippines economic and trade exchanges, while highlighting the importance of the United States, Japan and other alternative sources of investment and import and export markets, has tried to deceive voters into accepting the fact that economic growth and construction in areas such as people’s livelihood and infrastructure have slowed down.
The Marcos administration remains a de facto majority in the Senate controlling resources such as the House of Representatives and some media, stays confident that it will control domestics, and has no intention to adjust its policy direction due to midterm election defeat
Indeed, the Duterte still controls Davao City and fueled by political rising stars, but its influence stays local, lacking the capability of contending with the national dominance of the Marcos. Three years left for the Marcos administration, it still takes hold of unique resources including agenda setting, resource allocation, obtaining voter support, lobbying Allies and partner countries for assistance and support, thus taking an advantageous position against its political rivals. Therefore, it is foreseeable that the Marcos administration will follow the existing roadmap, maintain its one-sided policy to ally with the U.S., continue its “unilateralism” orientation on the South China Sea, and try to rebuild the political power of the Marcos together with its affiliated interest groups under the support of the West and the resonance of domestic voters.
Authors: Chen Xiangmiao, Part-Time Research Fellow at Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, and Mu Jiahao, Assistant Research Fellow at Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance
(Source: Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance)
The views do not necessarily reflect those of ECNS.
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